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FINDING THE SOLUTION IN WEC CAROLINA 
ENERGY SOLUTIONS: THE COMPUTER FRAUD 
AND ABUSE ACT IN THE WORKPLACE 
By: Emily V. Malone+ 
Have you ever checked the score of last night’s game from your office 
computer or taken an unauthorized break from work to search online to see if 
those new boots have gone on sale?  Such innocent actions may be federal crimes 
under the broad interpretations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 
adopted by three federal circuit courts.1  Chief Judge Kozinski, of the Ninth 
Circuit, argued that broadly interpreting the CFAA would 
transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into 
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.  Employees 
who call family members from their work phones will become 
criminals if they send an email instead.  Employees can sneak in the 
sports section of the New York Times to read at work, but they’d better 
not visit ESPN.com.  And sudoku enthusiasts should stick to the 
printed puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com from their 
work computers might give them more than enough time to hone their 
sudoku skills behind bars.2 
                     
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2010, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  The author wishes to thank Professor 
Carlisle for his invaluable expertise and guidance.  The author also wishes to thank her friends and 
family for their constant love and support.  Finally, the author would like to thank her colleagues 
on the Catholic University Law Review for their time and effort spent working on this Note. 
 1. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
the defendant violated the CFAA by exceeding his authorized access to certain databases when he 
used the database for personal use); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that the defendant violated the CFAA under an intended-use theory when she used 
information obtained through her work computer as part of a fraudulent scheme), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 1237 (2013); Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(applying agency theory and concluding that an employer’s CFAA-based suit against its former 
employee for destroying files in breach of his duty of loyalty to the employer should be reinstated). 
 2. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (referencing reading 
the CFAA’s language to encompass violations of private computer use policies as grounds for 
criminal liability). 
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Congress created the CFAA as an anti-hacking statute to prosecute people 
who broke into computer systems without authorization.3  The statute has 
undergone many changes since its inception in 1986 and now serves as the basis 
for bringing both criminal charges and civil actions for employee misconduct.4  
In today’s technologically-advanced world, courts have broadly interpreted the 
CFAA’s language, which has led to potentially disastrous unintended 
consequences.5 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only 8.2% of households had personal 
computers in 19846—the year that Congress enacted the first federal legislation 
criminalizing certain computer-related activity.7  Today however, computers are 
an integral part of everyday American life.8  As computer use becomes 
inextricably entwined with household, governmental, and commercial 
operations, the potential for digital crimes drastically increases and expands in 
scope, which, in turn, renders CFAA applicability practically boundless.9 
Recently, the CFAA has been applied in the workplace setting to punish 
employee wrongdoing involving company computers, databases, and other 
electronically-stored information.10  Federal circuit courts disagree over the most 
                     
 3. See Pamela Taylor, Comment, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act and its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 207 (2012); Obie Okuh, 
Comment, When Circuit Breakers Trip: Resetting the CFAA to Combat Rogue Employee Access, 
21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 645–46 (2011) (noting that CFAA was passed in response to 
concerns over computer-based crimes, which negatively affect commerce). 
 4. See infra Parts I.A.1–3. 
 5. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 220–26 (advancing a narrow interpretation of the CFAA and, 
rejecting broader interpretations as potentially rendering the CFAA unconstitutionally void); 
Andrew T. Hernacki, Comment, A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of 
Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543, 1548 
(2012) (explaining that although the statute, as initially conceived, was “modest,” the expansion of 
the computer industry has allowed the CFAA to “grow[] into a multi-faceted tool with a potentially 
limitless scope”). 
 6. Computer and Internet Use in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/computer/ (last visited Jan. 09, 2014). 
 7. Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured 
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 455 (1990); see also Counterfeit Access 
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 1837, 
2190-92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)) [hereinafter the 1984 Act].  The 1984 
Act has transformed into what we know today as the CFAA.  See infra Part I.A.2–3. 
 8. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).  The U.S. Census 
Bureau estimates that 75.6% of households had a computer in 2011, and 71.7% of households 
accessed the Internet in the same year, whereas in 1984 only 8.2% of households had computer and 
Internet usage was not even measured.  Computer and Internet Use in the United States, supra note 
6. 
 9. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1548 (arguing that the scope of the CFAA, in the world we live 
in today, could have drastic effects that were not properly understood during its initial enactment). 
 10. See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 202, 207 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under the CFAA), 
cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856; United States v. Rodriguez, 628 
F.3d 1258, 1260–62 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2010); 
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accurate way to interpret the CFAA in this scenario, with each court basing their 
disparate approaches on each court’s interpretation of the CFAA’s authorization 
language.11  Three theories interpreting this statutory language have emerged: 
the agency theory,12 the intended-use theory,13 and the access means access 
theory.14  The agency theory and the intended-use theory both broadly construe 
the CFAA’s authorization language.15  However, the agency theory bases 
violations of the CFAA on an employee’s breach of loyalty to the company,16 
whereas the intended-use theory bases violations on the employer’s computer-
use policies.17  The access means access theory offers the narrowest 
interpretation of the CFAA because it restricts violations to actual access of 
company information without authorization.18 
This Note discusses and endorses the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in WEC 
Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller that the authorization language of the 
CFAA should be narrowly interpreted.  Part I examines the CFAA, focusing on 
the authorization language, and traces the development of important 
amendments to the Act.  Part II analyzes the three approaches taken by federal 
circuit courts: agency theory, intended use theory, and access means access 
theory.  Part III scrutinizes the Fourth Circuit case, WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions, and argues that it extends the federal appellate courts’ trend by 
adopting the narrow view of the CFAA.  WEC Carolina Energy Solutions will 
                     
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009); Int’l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 
440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 11. See infra Part I.B–D (explaining the three approaches taken by various circuits). 
 12. See infra Part I.B.  Under agency theory, an employee automatically loses his or her 
authorized access to a work computer or files by acting in a manner converse to his or her 
employer’s interests because such action terminates the agency relationship between the employer 
and employee.  Taylor, supra note 3, at 213. 
 13. See infra Part I.C.  The intended-use theory relies on whether an employee knew that his 
or her actions went beyond the scope of his or her authorized access.  See Amber L. Leaders, Gimme 
a Brekka!: Deciphering “Authorization” Under the CFAA and How Employers Can Protect Their 
Data, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 285, 293 (2011). 
 14. See infra Part I.D.  The access means access theory has also been termed the plain 
meaning theory because it looks to the plain meaning of the statutory language and applies the rule 
of lenity to interpret the meaning of ambiguous terms, such as “authorization.”  See Leaders, supra 
note 13, at 290–92.  Under this theory whether or not the employee has “authorization” is defined 
by the actions of the employer.  See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133.  For example, the Brekka court stated 
that an employee has “authorization” to use a computer when “the employer gives the employee 
permission to use it.”  Id.  Under this theory, once the employer gives the employee permission to 
access the employer’s computers, the employee does not violate the CFAA, irrespective of how he 
later uses the data that he obtains through such access.  See Thomas E. Booms, Note, Hacking into 
Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 552 (2011). 
 15. See infra Parts I.B & C. 
 16. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 213–14; see also infra Part I.B (discussing how agency theory 
operates in CFAA cases). 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See infra Part I.D. 
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have a far-reaching impact on future CFAA litigation, as it is the first decision 
to embrace the narrow approach, since it was laid out by the Ninth Circuit in 
2009.  Finally, this Note proposes that the WEC Carolina Energy Solutions 
court’s narrow approach, which is based on the plain meaning of the statute and 
the rule of lenity, is supported by congressional intent and will provide for the 
most effective use of the CFAA in future litigation. 
I.  INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD & ABUSE ACT 
A.  The Evolution of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act 
1.  The Beginning: The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1984 
According to hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, in 1983, 
twenty-one states had passed legislation criminalizing the misuse of 
computers.19  Even though at the time of enactment almost half of the states had 
existing laws criminalizing computer fraud,20 Congress enacted the first federal 
statute that criminalized certain types of computer use,21 the Counterfeit Access 
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act).22  The 1984 
Act was relatively narrow in scope and only governed a few types of activity.23  
The 1984 Act made it a crime to “knowingly access a computer without 
authorization,” or access the computer without authorization to obtain defense 
or foreign affairs-related information, with the intent to use it to injure the United 
States or to help a foreign nation;24 “knowingly access a computer without 
authorization” or access an authorized computer for unauthorized purposes, to 
                     
 19. Computer Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2 (1983) (statement of Rep. Bill Nelson). 
 20. See id.  Prior to 1984, the types of computer crimes covered by the new legislation were 
prosecuted under federal statutes originally designed to cover other crimes, such as mail fraud and 
wire-tapping.  See Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act Should be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 405, 
409 & n.18 (2012). 
 21. Griffith, supra note 7, at 455.  The threat of computer related crimes such as hacking was 
magnified by popular culture and movies like the 1983 movie “War Games”, in which a teenager 
hacks into a government computer, gains control of United States nuclear arsenal, and almost 
causes a nuclear war.  See Kapitanyan, supra note 20, at 410; Okuh, supra note 3, at 646.  The 
movie was even mentioned in the 1984 House Report supporting the passage of the legislation.  
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10–11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,  
3895–96 (referencing the movie “War Games” as a means of demonstrating how computers can be 
used to increase processing power to engage in criminal activity more efficiently). 
 22. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.  
98-473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)). 
 23. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 455. 
 24. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, ch. 21, sec. 
2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)). 
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obtain financial information;25 “knowingly access a [U.S. Government] 
computer without authorization, or use such access to “use[], modif[y], 
destroy[], or disclose[] information in, or prevent[] authorized use of, such 
computer.”26 
Legislators and industry leaders criticized the 1984 Act, charging that the lack 
of available data regarding computers at the time of its inception made it 
incomplete, inefficient, and difficult for prosecutors to use effectively.27  Other 
commentators argued that the 1984 Act left a large regulatory gap because it did 
not address harm caused by those who misused authorized access.28  In response 
to this negative criticism, Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
of 1986 (the 1986 Act).29 
2.  An Attempt to Revise: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
In an attempt to remedy concerns over the liability produced by those with 
authorized access who cause harm, Congress added the phrase, “exceeds 
authorized access” to the 1986 Act.30  This tiny phrase is the root of the problem 
for courts interpreting, and employers seeking to use, the 1986 Act.31  In an effort 
to address federalism concerns, Congress “limit[ed] Federal jurisdiction over 
computer crime to those cases in which there is a compelling Federal interest, 
which is to say, where computers of the Federal Government or certain financial 
institutions are involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in nature.”32 
Not only did the 1986 Act clarify certain subsections of the 1984 Act, it also 
prohibited more computer-related acts, such as property theft using a computer 
as a part of a plan to defraud, intentionally altering or destroying others’ data, 
                     
 25. Id. at ch. 21, sec. 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190–91 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1030(a)(2)). 
 26. Id. at ch. 21, sec. 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2191 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1030(a)(3)). 
 27. Griffith, supra note 7, at 482–83 (“Computer crime was analogous to the proverbial 
emperor’s clothes: everybody proclaimed it was there, but no one could see it.”); see also Greg 
Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 
2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 012 ¶ 6 (noting the dearth of data relating to computer crime in 1984). 
 28. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1549. 
 29. Pub. L. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006)); see 
also Griffith, supra note 7, at 473 (explaining that Congress passed the 1986 Act to address 
problems with the 1984 Act); Hernaki, supra note 5, at 1549 (same). 
 30. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1549–50 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988)) (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006)). 
 31. See id. at 1550 (“This small phrase would later prove to have widespread interpretive 
problems.”); see also infra Part I.A.4. 
 32. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482.  
Additionally, Congress intended in the 1986 Act to strike an “appropriate balance between the 
Federal Government’s interest in computer crime and the interests and abilities of the States to 
proscribe and punish such offenses.”  Id.; see also Pollaro, supra note 27, at ¶ 7 (explaining that 
Congress acted cautiously, indicating intent to permit states to enact their own computer crime 
laws). 
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and password trafficking.33  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
current version of the CFAA addresses nine types of computer crimes.34 
3.  Important Amendments: The 1994 & 1996 Amendments to the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act 
The CFAA has been amended eight times since 1986, most significantly in 
1994 and 1996.35  In 1994, Congress passed an amendment that provided a 
private right of action under the CFAA.36  The CFAA was amended to state, in 
relevant part, that whoever “suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation 
 . . . may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory 
damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”37  Employers have used 
this provision to file civil suits against former employees.38 
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) also amended the CFAA.39  The 
EEA notably expanded the scope of the CFAA’s coverage by applying it to all 
“protected computers,” rather than solely to “federal interest” computers, as 
provided for by the older version of the CFAA.40  The term “protected computer” 
includes federal government computers, computers of financial institutions and 
computers used for interstate or foreign commerce purposes.41  The EEA 
expanded the scope of the CFAA by associating it with the breadth of the 
Commerce Clause.42 
                     
 33. Pollaro, supra note 27, at ¶ 7; Prosecuting Computer Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf (last visited Jan. 09, 2014). 
 34. Prosecuting Computer Crimes, supra note 33, at 3.  The statute criminalizes “Obtaining 
National Security Information,” “Accessing a Computer and Obtaining Information,” “Trespassing 
in a Government Computer,” “Accessing a Computer to Defraud & Obtain Value,” “Intentionally 
Damaging by Knowing Transmission,” “Recklessly Damaging by Intentional Access,” 
“Negligently Causing Damage & Loss by Intentional Access,” “Trafficking in Passwords,” and 
“Extortion Involving Computers.”  Id. 
 35. Pollaro, supra note 27, at ¶ 8 (noting that Congress amended the CFAA in 1988, 1989, 
1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008 to keep up with evolving computer crime); see also 
Prosecuting Computer Crimes, supra note 33, at 2 (same). 
 36. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1550. 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 38. These civil suits typically stem from actions taken by the employee just before he or she 
plans to leave his or her current employer and start a competing business, or from actions taken by 
the employee for other personal benefits.  See infra Parts I.B–D (discussing various cases in which 
employers brought civil actions against former employees under the CFAA). 
 39. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491. 
 40. Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1561, 1567 (2010); Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1550–51. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). 
 42. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1553 (explaining that the specific language used by Congress 
in defining what constitutes a protected computer expands the CFAA’s scope to include every 
computer used to perform “economic . . . activities that substantially affect commerce”); Kerr, 
supra note 40, at 1568 (internal citations omitted) (“Because every computer connected to the 
Internet is used in interstate commerce or communication, it seems that every computer connected 
to the Internet is a ‘protected computer’ covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1030.”); see also Pollaro, supra 
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4.  A Tiny Phrase that Causes a Huge Problem: The Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act’s Authorization Statute 
Many offenses under the current version of the CFAA require an offender to 
act “without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.”43  
The phrase “without authorization” is not defined in the CFAA, but the CFAA 
explains that an offender “exceeds authorized access” when he or she 
“access[es] a computer with authorization and . . . use[s] such access to obtain 
or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain 
or alter.”44  According to the CFAA’s legislative history, Congress drafted the 
language “exceeds authorized access” with the belief that it would most likely 
be applied to insiders who already had some degree of access to the computer.45  
In contrast, Congress anticipated that the “without authorization” language 
would be used to cover outsiders with no degree of access to the computer.46 
Courts have developed different approaches for interpreting this authorization 
language in the context of the workplace when the offender is an inside 
employee charged with misusing or misappropriating information.47  Consider 
the following scenario: an employee downloads confidential company 
information with the intent to use that information in a presentation made on 
behalf of the company’s competitor.  The company has given the employee 
explicit authorization to access the confidential information but the employee 
uses it in a malicious manner that was not anticipated by the company when it 
granted authorization.48  Whether the employee’s actions fall within the scope 
of the CFAA depends on how the court interprets the CFAA’s authorization 
language; interpretations vary among the circuits.49  Some circuits would 
                     
note 27, at ¶ 8 (explaining that defining protected computers in relation to interstate commerce 
substantially broadened the CFAA’s scope). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 44. Id. § 1030(e)(6). 
 45. Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”—A Primer on the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 174 (2011). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See infra Parts I.B–D (detailing the three approaches applied by various federal circuit 
courts). 
 48. These are roughly the facts of the most recent case to address the scope and meaning of 
the authorization statute of the CFAA.  See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 
F.3d 199, 201–02 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). The court’s holding and 
reasoning are explained in greater detail later in this Note.  See infra Part II. 
 49. See infra Parts I.B–D. 
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consider the employee’s actions within the CFAA’s scope,50 while others would 
hold that the CFAA does not apply.51 
B.  CFAA Authorization: Agency Theory 
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to officially rule on 
the CFAA authorization language.52  In International Airport Centers LLC v. 
Citrin, an employee of International Airport Centers LLC (IAC), Citrin, was 
issued an official company laptop to use for work purposes.53  Citrin decided to 
leave IAC to start his own business, in breach of his employment contract.54  In 
anticipation of quitting, he downloaded a program onto the company laptop that 
permanently deleted not only his files, but also any evidence that he had engaged 
in improper activity before quitting.55 
IAC filed a civil suit against Citrin alleging that he violated 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii), a provision of the CFAA that prohibits knowingly 
transmitting information without authorization that causes damage to a protected 
computer.56  The court, using the agency theory rationale, held that IAC had a 
valid claim against Citrin under the CFAA because an employee’s access 
authorization ends when the employee breaches his or her duty of loyalty to the 
employer.57 
In defining the scope of the CFAA’s authorization statute, the court relied on 
agency theory to develop a broad interpretation of the CFAA.58  Under agency 
                     
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the 
defendant’s conviction under the CFAA based on the intended-use theory); United States v. John, 
597 F.3d 263, 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming the defendant’s conviction under the CFAA based 
on the intended-use theory), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1237 (2013); Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 
440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) (reinstating an employer’s suit under the CFAA against a 
former employee based on the agency theory). 
 51. See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 201, 203 (affirming the 
dismissal of the employer’s CFAA claim against a former employee under the narrow access means 
access theory); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (affirming 
the district court’s dismissal of several CFAA charges under a plain language reading of the statute 
because the defendant’s accomplices had permission to access the company data base at issue); 
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to a former employee in a CFAA action brought by his 
employer under a plain language reading of the statute because the employee had authorization to 
use the computer in question at the time the alleged violation occurred). 
 52. Pollaro, supra note 27, at ¶ 12; see also Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418–19. 
 53. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.  Citrin worked in the real estate side of the business and assisted 
in locating and acquiring desirable properties for the company.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 420–21. 
 58. See id.  An “agency relationship” is defined as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when 
one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on 
the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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theory, “[u]nless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, 
without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is 
otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”59  The Citrin 
court held that Citrin breached his duty of loyalty to IAC when he decided to 
quit his job in violation of his employment contract and to destroy files 
belonging to IAC on his company computer.60  Once the breach of loyalty 
occurred, it terminated the agency relationship and, with it, Citrin’s authority to 
access the computer and its files.61  The agency theory interpretation, adopted 
by the Seventh Circuit, broadly construes the CFAA’s authorization language 
because it goes beyond the language of the statute to consider external issues 
such as agency relationships.62 
C.  CFAA Authorization: Intended Use Theory 
Like the agency theory, the intended use theory also broadly construes the 
CFAA, granting employers the ability to pursue civil action against employees 
for a broad range of activities under the CFAA.63  This theory, adopted by both 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, focuses on whether the employee misuses 
information in a way that the employer had not intended, rather than the 
employee’s unauthorized access to information.64 
In United States v. John, the Fifth Circuit affirmed John’s conviction for seven 
counts of criminal activity, including violation of Sections 1030(a)(2)(A) and 
(C) of the CFAA, which prohibit “exceed[ing] authorized access” to obtain 
information from a protected computer.65  John was working as an account 
manager for Citigroup when she accessed confidential customer account 
information and provided that information to her half-brother as part of a scheme 
                     
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958). 
 60. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.  Citrin’s actions were significant because, as an agent of his 
employer, he had “a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected 
with the agency relationship.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01. 
 61. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21. 
 62. Id. at 419–21. 
 63. See Leaders, supra note 13, at 293 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
CFAA’s authorization language in John, adopting the intended-use theory, is broader than 
interpretations of the same language by other courts). 
 64. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1237 (2013).  Although the 
Eleventh Circuit did not use the words “intended-use theory,” the court applied similar reasoning 
to reach its holding as the Fifth Circuit used in John.  Compare Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 
(explaining that the employee exceeded the scope of his authorized access and thus violated the 
CFAA by accessing victim’s personal records for non-business reasons), with John, 597 F.3d at 
270–72 (holding that an employee had exceeded her authorized access where the employee knew 
she was accessing information on a computer for an illegal purpose); see also Leaders, supra note 
13, at 292–94 (2011) (providing an overview of how the intended-use theory played a role in the 
holdings of both the John and Rodriguez cases). 
 65. John, 597 F.3d at 269–70.  But only two of the seven were in violation of the CFAA.  Id. 
at 269–70. 
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to allow him to make fraudulent charges.66  John admitted to being aware of 
Citigroup’s explicit employee policies prohibiting the misuse of customer 
information.67  The court applied the intended-use theory and concluded that, 
“[a]ccess to a computer and data that can be obtained from that access may be 
exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”68  
Additionally, the court emphasized John’s prior notice and knowledge of 
company policies as indicators of John’s actual knowledge of the intended 
purpose for his access.69  This case highlights two practical aspects of CFAA 
jurisprudence.  First, John illustrates criminal charges may be brought against 
an employee under the CFAA.70  Second, the case demonstrates the private right 
of action available to employers victimized by employee behavior.71 
In United States v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit also examined the scope 
of the CFAA’s authorization language in the context of a criminal case.72  The 
court upheld Rodriguez’s conviction for violating Section 1030 (a)(2)(B) of the 
CFAA.73  Rodriguez worked at the Social Security Administration (SSA) and 
was given explicit access to various databases to use as part of his duties.74  
Rodriguez used one of these databases for his personal use to retrieve 
information about women who he found romantically desirable.75  Rodriguez 
knew that the SSA had a strict policy against using the database information for 
non-business reasons.76 
                     
 66. Id. at 269.  The information obtained included computer printouts containing account 
numbers and copies of scanned personal checks.  Id. 
 67. Id. at 272. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 272 (highlighting that Citigroup’s official policy prohibiting the misuse of 
confidential customer account information was reiterated in meetings that John attended). 
 70. Id. at 270–72. 
 71. See id. at 269–70; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006). 
 72. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 73. Id.  Section § 1030 (a)(2)(B) of the CFAA prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer 
without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information 
from any department or agency of the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 
2012). 
 74. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260.  The SSA databases that Rodriguez was given access to 
contained personal information, including addresses, dates of birth, and social security numbers.  
Id. 
 75. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1557.  Rodriguez used the personal information to call women, 
send them flowers and letters at their homes, and obtain their birth dates.  Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 
1260–63.  In almost all of the cases, the victims had not disclosed their addresses, phone numbers, 
or date of birth to the defendant and were concerned to discover that he possessed this information.  
Id. 
 76. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.  The SSA policy “prohibits an employee from obtaining 
information from its databases without a business reason.”  Id. at 1260.  All of the SSA’s 
TeleService employees, including Rodriguez, were made aware of this policy “through mandatory 
training sessions, notices posted in the office, and a banner that appeared on every computer screen 
daily.”  Id.  The court also noted that SAA required employees to acknowledge receipt of the 
policies in writing annually and warned employees that criminal penalties could be imposed for 
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The court held that Rodriguez was criminally liable under the CFAA and, 
using the intended-use analysis, found a company’s computer use policies could 
be used to define authorized access within the meaning of the CFAA and thereby 
specify the scope of actions violating the statute.77  When Rodriguez accessed 
the information for non-business reasons, he effectively exceeded his authorized 
access in violation of the SSA’s policy.78 
D.  CFAA Authorization: Access Means Access/Plain Meaning Theory 
The third theory federal appellate courts have used to determine the scope of 
the CFAA’s authorization language is the plain meaning theory.  This approach 
was originally adopted by the Ninth Circuit79 and, more recently, by the Fourth 
Circuit.80 
In LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, the Ninth Circuit addressed the CFAA’s 
authorization language in the context of a civil case in which an employer, 
LVRC Holdings LLC (LVRC), sued a former employee, Brekka, for violating 
Sections 1030(a)(2) and (4) of the CFAA.81  Both sections of the CFAA impose 
liability only when the employee acts without authorization or in a manner that 
exceeds his or her authorization.82  Brekka was hired to work as an administrator 
for a rehab clinic.83  His duties included overseeing the company’s online 
marketing efforts.84  Brekka was given a company computer and full access to 
LVRC’s website via an administrative log-in.85  LVRC did not establish 
company policies for the use of company documents by employees, nor did they 
have a written employment agreement with Brekka.86  Brekka left LVRC’s 
                     
violations.  Id.  Rodriguez refused to sign the forms acknowledging the SSA’s policies, “ask[ing] a 
supervisor rhetorically, ‘Why give the government rope to hang me?’”  Id. 
 77. Id. at 1263 (“Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access and violated the Act when he 
obtained personal information for a nonbusiness purpose.”); Tuma, supra note 45, at 180 (noting 
that the Rodriguez court applied intended-use theory reasoning to reach its conclusion). 
 78. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263. 
 79. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 80. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203–04 (4th Cir. 2012), 
cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). 
 81. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129.  Section 1030 (a)(2) prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a 
computer without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby  
obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 
2012).  Section 1030 (a)(4) prohibits “knowingly and with intent to defraud, access[ing] a protected 
computer without authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized access, and by means of such conduct 
further[ing] the intended fraud and obtain[ing] anything of value.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 83. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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employ;87 but before quitting, Brekka emailed confidential company documents 
to his personal computer with the intent to use the information to start his own 
competing business.88  LVRC sued Brekka, arguing that, pursuant to the agency 
theory adopted by the Citrin court, LVRC could bring an action against Brekka 
under the CFAA.89 
The Ninth Circuit rejected LVRC’s argument, stating that the CFAA is 
primarily a criminal statute and should not be interpreted in a “surprising” 
manner that is inconsistent with the statutory language.90  Instead, the court 
relied on the statutory construction cannon of plain meaning, stating that the 
CFAA should be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of its words 
unless the terms are otherwise defined.91  The court referenced the dictionary 
definition of “authorization”92 to explain that the plain meaning of the statute 
does not support the agency theory approach because the CFAA does not 
indicate that an employee’s authorization terminates when he or she uses the 
computer in a manner contrary to the employer’s interest.93 
The court also used the plain meaning of the statute to rebut the intended use 
theory, reasoning that, “[t]he definition of the term ‘exceeds authorized access’ 
. . . implies that an employee can violate employer-placed limits on accessing 
information stored on the computer and still have authorization to access that 
computer.”94  The court noted that the plain language of the CFAA does not 
explicitly reject the access means access theory, and furthermore, that the 
legislative history of the CFAA does not support a broad interpretation of the 
authorizing language.95  The court also explained that the rule of lenity supports 
                     
 87. Id. at 1129–30 (noting that Brekka left after negotiation efforts regarding giving him an 
ownership interest in the company failed). 
 88. Id. (stating that the documents Brekka sent included, “a financial statement for the 
company, LVRC’s marketing budget, admissions reports for patients . . . . [and] a master admissions 
report, which included the names of past and current patients of the rehab clinic”). 
 89. Id. at 1130, 1133–34.  LVRC tried to bring an additional claim against Brekka after the 
company discovered that someone accessed files using Brekka’s assigned password after Brekka 
was fired.  Id. at 1136–37.  However, the district court dismissed the claim due to a lack of evidence 
establishing that Brekka was the responsible party.  Id. 
 90. Id. at 1134. 
 91. Id. at 1132 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 92. Id. at 1133 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 
(2001)) (noting that authorization is defined as “permission or power granted by an authority”). 
 93. Id.  (“It is the employer’s decision to allow or to terminate an employee’s authorization 
to access a computer that determines whether the employee is with or ‘without authorization.’”). 
 94. Id. at 1135. 
 95. Id.  The CFAA’s legislative history “shows that the statute was intended to apply only to 
crimes of computer misuse and not to crimes incidentally involving the use of a computer” and is 
thus analogous to “‘breaking and entering’” rather than mere facilitation.”  Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science Can Help with the Problem of 
Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 238 (2010) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 32 
(1984)).  Scholars have explained that the CFAA was meant to be a stop-gap measure targeted at 
gaps in traditional crime laws, which were improperly structured to handle new computer-misuse 
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a narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s language.96  The rule of lenity specifies 
that when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be construed in a manner most 
favorable to the defendant.97  Similarly, the court noted that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has long warned against interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and 
novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on defendants.”98 
The court ultimately concluded that LVRC did not have a valid claim against 
Brekka under the CFAA.99  The court held that Brekka’s actions did not exceed 
his authorized access because his actions fell within the computer usage allowed 
by his company and because the CFAA is concerned with access, not what is 
done with that access.100  The court concluded that a person acts without 
authorization under the CFAA only “when the person has not received 
permission to use the computer for any purpose (such as when a hacker accesses 
someone’s computer without any permission), or when the employer has 
rescinded permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the 
computer anyway.”101 
The Ninth Circuit had another opportunity to address the scope of the CFAA’s 
authorization language in United States v. Nosal, this time in the context of a 
criminal case.102  Nosal also involved a situation in which employees used their 
authorized access to download company information for the purpose of starting 
a competing company.103  However, in Nosal, the employer had explicit 
company policies prohibiting this action.104  Nosal was a former employee at the 
time he downloaded the documents.105  He was charged under Section 1030 
(a)(4) of the CFAA for aiding and abetting some of the company’s current 
employees in “‘exceed[ing their] authorized access’ with intent to defraud.”106 
                     
offenses, and thus was meant to address only these new categories of crime.  Orin S. Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1603 (2003); Chung, supra, at 238–39. 
 96. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134–35. 
 97. Id. at 1135 (quoting United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 98. Id. at 1134. 
 99. Id. at 1135. 
 100. Id. (“There is no dispute that Brekka was given permission to use LVRC’s computer and 
that he accessed documents or information to which he was entitled by virtue of his employment 
with LVRC . . . . [therefore] he did not access a computer ‘without authorization.’”); see also 
Leaders, supra note 14, at 291–92 (evaluating the Brekka court’s holding). 
 101. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135. 
 102. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).  It is irrelevant 
whether the case is criminal or civil for the purpose of analyzing how the courts have interpreted 
the scope of the CFAA authorization language because the civil damages only flow if the employee 
would be found criminally liable.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 103. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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The court rejected the broad interpretations of the CFAA adopted by the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.107  Instead, the Nosal court opted to follow the 
Brekka court’s approach, and urged the other circuits to reconsider their 
interpretations.108  The court adopted the Brekka court’s narrow interpretation of 
the CFAA authorization language, holding that, “the phrase ‘exceeds authorized 
access’ in the CFAA does not extend to violations of use restrictions.”109 
II.  WEC CAROLINA ENERGY SOLUTIONS: DEEPENING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND 
LEAVING EMPLOYERS SCRATCHING THEIR HEADS 
The Fourth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions.110  WEC Carolina Energy Solutions 
(WEC) sued its former employee, Miller, under the CFAA’s private right of 
action provision alleging violations of Sections 1030 (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(B), 
and (a)(5)(C), “each of which require that a party either access a computer 
‘without authorization’ or ‘exceed[] authorized access.’”111  While still 
employed at WEC, Miller e-mailed confidential company information to his 
personal computer from his company laptop and, after resigning, he used that 
information to make a presentation to a potential customer on behalf of one of 
WEC’s competitors.112  WEC had established company policies prohibiting the 
use of company information in this manner.113 
                     
 107. Id. at 862–63. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 863.  The Nosal case has followed an interesting trajectory.  Prior to the en banc 
rehearing in 2012, the Ninth Circuit panel used the Nosal opinion (Nosal panel) as an opportunity 
to narrow the holding in Brekka to the specific facts of the case, effectively nullifying the narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA’s authorization language.  See Jeff Neuburger, Ninth Circuit Panel Says 
Employee Violation of Employer Computer Use Policy Can Support CFAA Criminal Charge, NEW 
MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG (April 29, 2011), http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2011/04/29/ninth 
-circuit-panel-says-employee-violation-of-employer-computer-use-policy-can-support-cfaa 
-criminal-charge/. The Nosal panel opinion aligned the Ninth Circuit with the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits by adopting the intended use theory.  See id.  (stating that the Nosal panel reversed the 
district court and “explicitly weighed in on the side of the other circuit courts that have addressed 
the issue”).  However, as noted above, the Nosal panel opinion was reversed en banc and 
reinvigorated the Brekka court’s interpretation.  See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (“[W]e continue to 
follow in the path blazed by Brekka.”).  For a recounting of the interesting procedural history of 
Nosal, see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 257, 264–69 (2012). 
 110. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012), 
cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (explaining that the court agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s 
“literal[] and narrow[]” interpretation of the CFAA’s authorization language). 
 111. Id. at 201–03.  WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC also alleged nine additional claims 
under state law against Miller.  Id. at 202. 
 112. Id. Apparently, Miller had access to confidential information stored on the company’s 
network through his company-issued laptop, including trade secrets, “pricing terms, pending 
projects[,] and the technical capabilities of WEC.” Id.  As a result of Miller’s presentation, WEC’s 
potential client decided to work with the competitor.  Id. 
 113. Id. 
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The court held that WEC did not have a claim against Miller under the 
CFAA.114  The court adopted a narrow interpretation of the statute’s 
authorization language, holding that it only applies “when an individual accesses 
a computer without permission or obtains or alters information on a computer 
beyond that which he is authorized to access.”115  The WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions court employed reasoning similar to the Ninth Circuit in Brekka and 
Nosal, and explicitly rejected the agency theory and the intended use theory, 
holding that the narrow interpretation is better supported by the plain meaning 
of the statute and the rule of lenity.116 
In adopting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions court added credibility and support to the access means access 
theory.117  Since the Fourth Circuit issued the WEC Carolina Energy Solutions 
holding, the narrow interpretation, which was once described as contrary to  
well-supported precedent,118 has been deemed “a trend that other courts will 
follow.”119  The issue has also recently been described as having “new potential 
. . . to reach the Supreme Court.”120 
The deepened circuit split causes significant problems for employers because 
a situation that would result in liability under the CFAA in one state may not 
result in liability in another.121  For example, according to one commentator, 
“whether an employer can bring CFAA claims against employees who steal 
company data in violation of computer usage policies depends on where the 
                     
 114. Id. at 206–07. 
 115. Id. (explaining that Miller’s actions did not meet this requirement because, although he 
“may have misappropriated information, [he] did not access a computer without authorization or 
exceed [his] authorized access”). 
 116. See id. at 203-07; LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 117. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, 687 F.3d at 203. 
 118. See Brief of Appellant at 10, WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller 687 F.3d 
199 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1201), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). 
 119. Matthew J. Hank, Fourth Circuit Joins Courts Limiting Use of Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to Prosecute Disloyal Employee, UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADE SECRETS COUNSEL 
(Aug. 02, 2012), http://www.unfaircompetitiontradesecretscounsel.com/federal-law/computer 
-fraud-abuse-act/fourth-circuit-joins-courts-limiting-use-of-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-to 
-prosecute-disloyal-emplo/index.html.  The lesson to learn from WEC Carolina Energy Solutions 
is that, “where the employee downloads information to which he was permitted access and then 
misuses that data to benefit a competitor, the employer will not have recourse to a CFAA claim and 
should focus on state-law claims.”  Id. 
 120. Ilana Rubel & Sebastian Kaplan, Ninth Circuit Scales Back CFAA Application to Data 
Misappropriation Cases, FENWICK & WEST LLP, http://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages 
/Ninth-Circuit-Scales-Back-CFAA-Application-to-Data-Misappropriation-Cases.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 09, 2014). 
 121. Taylor, supra note 3, at 202–03 (explaining that the circuit split “leaves employers in a 
very uncertain position as to how best to protect their data”).  This determination is contingent on 
which circuit a particular state falls within and which theory that circuit advocates.  An even more 
difficult situation for employers is when the jurisdiction in which they file their action has yet to 
establish a position.  See id. 
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employer can file suit.”122  The confusion resulting from the circuit split has been 
described as creating a bleak and confusing situation for employers.123 
While this issue has struggled to reach the United States Supreme Court, it is 
increasingly important that employers receive definitive guidance.124  The 
Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions on January 2, 2013.125  Additionally, following the Ninth Circuit’s en 
banc decision in Nosal, the United States Department of Justice declined to file 
a petition seeking review.126  These missed opportunities for direction from the 
Supreme Court only heighten the confusion and chaos surrounding the CFAA’s 
authorization language. 
This issue has also been addressed in a proposed amendment to the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (CSA), which highlighted the importance of finding 
                     
 122. Abigail Rubenstein, Circuit Split On CFAA Leaves Employers Scratching Heads, LAW 
360 (Aug. 13, 2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/369259/circuit-split 
-on-cfaa-leaves-employers-scratching-heads.  For now, employers located in the Fourth Circuit will 
have to rely on state law claims to prosecute employees suspected of absconding with confidential 
information.  John Marsh, WEC Carolina Energy Solutions v. Miller: The Fourth Circuit Adopts 
the Reasoning of U.S. v. Nosal and Limits the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Hacking, TRADE 
SECRET LITIGATOR BLOG (July 30, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://www.hahnloeser.com 
/tradesecretlitigator/post/2012/07/30/WEC-Carolina-Energy-Solutions-v-Miller-The-Fourth 
-Circuit-Adopts-the-Reasoning-of-US-v-Nosal-and-Limits-the-Computer-Fraud-and-Abuse-Act 
-to-Hacking.aspx. 
 123. Rubenstein, supra note 122; Matt Lampe, Employer Lawsuits Against Employees Under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT N.Y. (“LENY”) THE OFFICIAL BLOG 
OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION (August 
17, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/LENY/2012/08/  (“[T]he circuit split is sure to 
remain for the foreseeable future and the application of the CFAA to the employment context will 
be unresolved.”).  There may be more benefits for employers filing actions in federal court under 
the CFAA than for employers who resort to state law claims, such as lessening what the employer 
must show to bring suit against the employee and providing the ability to bring suit against the 
former employee’s new employer and to request injunctive relief.  Kapitanyan, supra note 20, at 
418. 
 124. See Michael P. Maslanka, Circuits Split on Important CFAA Issue, TEXAS LAWYER (Oct. 
1, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202572840856&thepage=1&slreturn 
=20121019154119 (describing this issue as one ripe for review because it is an issue of interest for 
employers and there is “well-developed” support for the different interpretations of the statutory 
language). 
 125. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013).  WEC Carolina 
Energy Solutions filed a petition for writ of certiorari on October 24, 2102 asking the Court to 
review whether an employer’s restrictions on the purpose electronic information is used for can 
provide the basis for CFAA liability.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-518), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 
(2013). 
 126. Rubenstein, supra note 122.  According to Orin Kerr, the Justice Department declined to 
file a petition seeking Supreme Court review of the Nosal opinion “because [the government] ‘may 
have been scared off by Judge Kozinski’s [Nosal] opinion . . . [which is] a pretty powerful brief 
against the government’s position.’”  David Kravets, DOJ Won’t Ask Supreme Court to Review 
Hacking Case, WIRED.COM (Aug. 10, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/threat 
level/2012/08/computer-fraud-supreme-court/. 
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finality on the issue.127   Although the amendment was not accepted, it would 
have, in effect, adopted the plain language approach espoused by the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits.128 
Beyond the purely legal reasons why this issue should be reviewed, this issue 
has implications for many individuals, as demonstrated by the recent  
high-profile prosecution of Aaron Swartz.129  The government charged Swartz 
with violating the CFAA after he illegally accessed the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology’s computer network to download approximately 4.8 million 
academic articles from a database called JSTOR, in direct violation of JSTOR’s 
terms of service.130  If convicted, Swartz could have faced up to thirty-five years 
in federal prison and a fine of one million dollars.131  Swartz committed suicide 
before his case could reach trial.132  Illustrating the disparate approaches taken 
by the various circuits, Swartz would have been arraigned under First Circuit 
precedent, thus whether a violation was properly alleged under the CFAA 
depends on which of the three approaches the First Circuit court chose to 
follow.133 
                     
 127. See Orin Kerr, Recent Developments – Both in the Courts and in Congress–on the Scope 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/30/recent-developments-both-in-the-courts-and-in-congress-on 
-the-scope-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ [hereinafter Kerr on Volokh].  The Cybersecurity 
Act of 2012 (CSA) was a bipartisan effort developed to protect private and governmental 
organizations from cyber attacks.  Securing America’s Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 1–4 (2012) 
(statement of Sen. Joseph Liberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.  
& Gov’t Affairs).  The drafters of the CSA shared many of the same fears as the drafters of the 
CFAA, including the potential for cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and for damage the 
economy.  See id. at 1–2. 
 128. See Kerr on Volokh, supra note 127.  The proposed language would have changed United 
States Code Section 1030(e)(6) by inserting the following language: 
“alter, but does not include access in violation of a contractual obligation or agreement, 
such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an Internet service 
provider, Internet website, or non-government employer, if such violation constitutes the 
sole basis for determining that access to a protected computer is unauthorized.” 
158 CONG. REC. S5403 (daily ed. July 25, 2012).  Although the Court may wish to wait for a 
legislative fix to this growing problem, the legislative branch can move very slowly and the severity 
of this issue only deepens with technological advances. 
 129. See Justin Peters, Aaron Swartz May Have Violated JSTOR’s Terms of Service.  Should 
That Be a Crime?, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013 
/02/15/aaron_swartz_suicide_should_violating_a_website_s_terms_of_service_be_a.html. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Mass., Alleged Hacker Charged 
With Stealing Over Four Million Documents from MIT Network (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/SwartzAaronPR.html. 
 132. See Peters, supra note 129. 
 133. See id.  The plain meaning theory would not control Aaron Swartz’s case if he was 
indicted in Massachusetts; his case would have been controlled by First Circuit precedent.  See 
Indictment, United States v. Swartz, (D. Mass. July 14, 2011), available at http://web. 
mit.edu/bitbucket/Swartz,%20Aaron%20Indictment.pdf. 
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Although Swartz’s case did not involve a private right of action brought by an 
employer,134 it presents larger questions as to the negative effects of allowing 
expansive prosecutorial discretion under some interpretations of the CFAA’s 
language.  This tragic event may prove to be the catalyst that results in Supreme 
Court review of the circuit split over the CFAA’s authorization language. 
III.  THE WEC CAROLINA ENERGY SOLUTIONS APPROACH IS NECESSARY 
A.  A Logical Interpretation of the Plain Meaning of the CFAA 
In WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, the Fourth Circuit followed the analysis 
for interpreting the CFAA’s authorizing language as set out by the Ninth 
Circuit.135  The court addressed WEC’s interpretation of the CFAA’s language 
supporting the claim that Miller’s actions violated the CFAA by exceeding his 
authorized access.136  WEC relied on the Nosal panel’s reasoning and argued 
that the word “so” in the statutory definition of “exceeds authorized access” 
should be interpreted to mean “in a manner or way that is indicated or 
suggested.”137  Therefore, an employee exceeds his authorized access under the 
CFAA “if he uses such access ‘to obtain or alter information [on] the computer 
that [he] is not entitled [in that manner] to obtain or alter.’”138 
However, interpreting “so” in this way insufficiently supports WEC’s claim 
that Miller violated the CFAA by his violating the company’s use policy.139  The 
Fourth Circuit explained that under WEC’s proposed definition, the statute could 
mean that the employee violates the CFAA when he lacks actual authorization 
to access the information.140  Under such an interpretation, the CFAA’s 
authorization language refers to the means of obtaining information, not the 
employee’s use of that information after the initial access.141  For example, an 
employee who disregards company policies and removes a thumb drive 
containing information he is only authorized to access at the office would be 
implicated by this interpretation.142  Although the employee is not violating a 
policy that dictates the way that the information may be used, he has still 
                     
 134. Swartz was not an employee of JSTOR and JSTOR declined to purse civil charges against 
him.  See Press Release, JSTOR, JSTOR Statement: Misuse Incident and Criminal Case (July 19, 
2011), http://about.jstor.org/news/jstor-statement-misuse-incident-and-criminal-case. 
 135. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204–07 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(adopting the method of analysis used by the Ninth Circuit in Nosal), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 
831 (2013). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 204–05 (quoting United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 138. Id. at 205 (quoting Nosal, 642 F.3d at 785–86). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (citing Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858). 
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“obtain[ed] information ‘in a manner’ that lacks authorization” by removing 
information he is not authorized to take from the office.143 
Furthermore, WEC’s theory places great significance on “so,” “a two-letter 
word that is essentially a conjunction.”144  This reliance may be misplaced 
because, as the court suggests, Congress could have intended a different 
meaning or purpose for “so,” such as, use “as a connector or for emphasis.”145  
The most persuasive interpretation of the CFAA is that the plain meaning of the 
statute only prohibits improperly accessing information, and an employee 
exceeds his approved access when he uses it “to obtain or alter information that 
falls outside the bounds of his approved access.”146 
Although this interpretation is the most logical, alternative interpretations are 
at least plausible.  But it is well-established that when a criminal statute is 
susceptible to two plausible interpretations, the court must favor the one that has 
a softer effect on the defendant.147 As a result, the statute should be read strictly, 
which is better accomplished by the narrower, plain meaning theory. 
B.  Employers Have Numerous Other Ways to Address Misappropriation of 
Company Information by Employees 
Rather than stretching the scope of the CFAA beyond the bounds originally 
intended by Congress,148 employers should utilize one of the many other forms 
of redress available to them in combating employee misappropriation of 
company information.149  In many scenarios arising from employee misconduct, 
companies suing under the CFAA could have availed themselves of state law 
remedies instead, such as suing the employee for misappropriation of a trade 
secret.150  A trade secret is “some sort of information that has value because it is 
                     
 143. Id. (citing Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858). 
 144. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857 (referencing the government’s interpretation in Nosal, which is 
similar to the plaintiff’s argument in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions). 
 145. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 205 (quoting Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858). 
 146. See id. at 204. 
 147. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (quoting United States v. Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952)) (explaining when the rule of lenity applies).  The 
rule of lenity has been described as “a necessary safety valve in an adversarial system of justice.” 
The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 475 (2008).   The Supreme Court 
has justified the rule of lenity in part on the grounds that, “when [a] choice has to be made between 
two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the 
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and 
definite.”  See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 221–22. 
 148. Hernacki, supra note 5, at 1574–75 (arguing in favor of a narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA’s authorization language that is consistent with Congress’s original intent to treat the CFAA 
as an anti-hacking statute). 
 149. See infra text accompanying notes 150–57. 
 150. See generally Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (explaining that unlike CFAA violations, trade secret civil cases must be tried 
in state courts because trade secret law derives from common law and thus varies by state). 
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not generally known.”151  The Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) allows for 
recovery if trade secrets are “misappropriated,” meaning obtained by “improper 
means.”152  This private right of action is available to most employers because 
all but six states have enacted some version of the UTSA.”153 
Additionally, several states have concluded that employees owe a duty of 
loyalty to their employers.154  This duty of loyalty requires that an employee “not 
divert business from his or her employer to a competing business nor engage in 
self-dealing while in the company’s employ.”155  The Sixth Circuit, in a diversity 
of citizenship case, held the duty of loyalty imposed by the state in question 
included “the obligation not to act against the employer’s interest.”156  Bringing 
a private suit alleging trade secret misappropriation and breach of a duty of 
loyalty is a more appropriate means of redress for employers than stretching the 
CFAA beyond its intended purpose. 
C.  The WEC Carolina Energy Solutions Approach Ensures that Innocent 
Behavior Will Not Become Criminalized 
The narrow interpretation of the CFAA better circumscribes the CFAA’s 
scope.  Under the agency theory, a valid CFAA claim merely requires that the 
employee used a computer in a way that breached his duty of loyalty to the 
employer or was adverse to the interests of the employer.157  Under the  
intended-use theory, the validity of the CFAA claim depends on whether the 
employee violated company policies.158  Both of these broad interpretations 
                     
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 8.  The term “improper means,” as defined in the UTSA, “includes theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage 
through electronic or other means.”  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (1986).  Commentators 
have noted that improper conduct “includes acts that are actionable in and of themselves—trespass, 
breach of contract, conversion of physical property, and, under modern laws, the misuse of 
computer networks.”  Risch, supra note 150, at 10. 
 153. See id. at 15.  The type of remedy awarded under an action for misappropriation of a trade 
secret varies depending on the court. 14 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d Misappropriation of Trade 
Secret under the Restatement of Torts § 19 (1991) (explaining the damages that plaintiffs may 
typically recover in trade secrets cases and highlighting common methods for determining 
compensation). 
 154. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1266-67 (Mass. 1989) (holding that 
the employee owed a duty of loyalty to the employer); Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 
320, 327 (Mass. 1983) (same); Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999) (same). 
 155. Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United States, 
20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 321, 322 (1999). 
 156. DSG Corp. v. Anderson, 754 F.2d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 157. See supra Part I.B. 
 158. See supra Part I.C.  Under the intended-use theory, it would be difficult for employees to 
know in any given instance whether their computer use is authorized or not.  See United States v. 
Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 790 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).  In other 
words, unless the employer issues a detailed company policy handbook, it would be challenging to 
know whether a particular behavior constitutes a crime.  Id.  Broad interpretations of the CFAA 
implicate criminal consequences when the policies are not “necessarily drafted with the definiteness 
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potentially criminalize a wide swath of otherwise-innocent behaviors such as, 
online shopping or checking social networking profiles from a work computer, 
which may be adverse to an employer’s interest, but are far from criminal.159  
The WEC Carolina Energy Solutions court highlighted the deficiencies in both 
of these broad interpretations.  The court explained that under these 
interpretations, “any employee who checked the latest Facebook posting or 
sporting event scores in contravention of his employer’s use policy would be 
subject to the instantaneous cessation of his agency and, as a result, would be 
left without any authorization to access his employer’s computer systems. ”160  
An interpretation that raises such serious public policy concerns cannot have 
been what Congress intended or what courts should allow. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Courts and scholars have struggled with how to best interpret the CFAA’s 
authorization language.  The two broad interpretations, agency and intended use 
theory, may offer the employer an easy solution for combating employee 
misappropriation of company information, but in practice, these judicial 
interpretations give employers extraordinary discretion in defining what 
constitutes criminal activity.  The WEC Carolina Energy Solutions court and 
others following the narrow access means access theory have attempted to find 
a workable balance between enforcement and flexibility.  The access means 
access theory provides the best approach for determining the scope of the CFAA 
in the workplace environment.  This issue is very important and, if not addressed, 
will continue to cause confusion as a result of conflicting circuit court opinions. 
  
                     
or precision that would be requires for a criminal statue.”  Id.  The void-for-vagueness doctrine 
“requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.”  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).  Other 
commentators have argued that the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires courts to adopt the narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA.  See Kerr, supra note 40 (arguing that due to the CFAA’s broad reach, 
a broad reading of the statute could “render it unconstitutional” by providing “insufficient notice 
of what is prohibited or fail[ing] to provide guidelines for law enforcement in violation of the 
constitutional requirement of Due Process of the law”). 
 159. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012), 
cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.  Just because an activity distracts 
someone from her work does not mean that she should be held criminally liable.  This result is 
disproportionately harsh. 
 160. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 206. 
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